Competition Law: INFORMATION, UPDATES AND ANALYSIS, May 2015
United States of America
Federal Trade Commission (‘FTC’)
Federal Appeals Court upholds FTC Order that found McWane, Inc. unlawfully maintained monopoly in Domestic Pipe Fittings
April 17, 2015
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld a FTC decision and order finding that McWane, Inc., the largest U.S. supplier of ductile iron pipe fittings used in municipal and regional water distribution systems, unlawfully maintained its monopoly in the domestic fittings market through exclusionary conduct.
FTC ruled that McWane imposed an illegal exclusive dealing policy on its distributors, which effectively prevented them from buying domestic pipe fittings from new competitor Star Pipe Products Ltd. (‘Star’) if the distributors wished to also continue buying the fittings from McWane. McWane’s conduct prevented Star from achieving the sales necessary to compete effectively and threaten McWane’s monopoly in the domestic fittings market. In so ruling, FTC upheld an Initial Decision by Chief Administrative Law Judge D. Michael Chappell.
Cardinal Health agrees to pay $26.8 Million to settle charges it monopolized 25 markets for the sale of Radiopharmaceuticals to Hospitals and Clinics
April 20, 2015
The FTC announced that Cardinal Health, Inc. (‘Cardinal’) has agreed to resolve charges that it illegally monopolized 25 local markets for the sale and distribution of low-energy radiopharmaceuticals and forced hospitals and clinics to pay inflated prices for these drugs. The proposed stipulated order requires Cardinal to pay $26.8 million of ill-gotten gains and represents the second largest monetary settlement the FTC has obtained in an antitrust case. The money will be deposited into a fund for distribution to injured customers. The order also includes provisions to prevent future violations and restore competition in six markets where Cardinal remains the dominant radiopharmacy.
As alleged in the FTC complaint, between 2003 and 2008, Bristol-Myers Squibb and General Electric Co. (which acquired Amersham plc in 2004) were the only U.S. manufacturers of heart perfusion agents (‘HPAs’). During this time, a radiopharmacy could not profitably enter a new market and compete without obtaining the right to distribute either Cardiolite (‘BMS’s HPA’) or Myoview (‘GE’s HPA’).
As described in the Complaint, Cardinal’s anticompetitive tactics included: Cancelling, and threatening to cancel, Cardinal’s current or future purchases of the manufacturers’ radiopharmaceutical products; Threatening to switch, and actually switching, customers from BMS’s Cardiolite to GE’s Myoview in the relevant markets to pressure BMS to abandon plans to license Cardiolite to new competitors; Threatening to compete, and offering to forego competing, against BMS as a generic HPA manufacturer; and Conditioning Cardinal’s future relationship with GE in the radiopharmaceutical industry on GE’s refusal to grant Myoview distribution rights to new competitors in the relevant markets.
The Complaint charged that Cardinal violated the FTC Act by blocking or delaying competitive entry, and thereby monopolizing the sale and distribution of radiopharmaceuticals to hospitals and clinics in the 25 markets.
Court Bars Brooklyn Company from Using Threats and Intimidation to Coerce Elderly Consumers into Paying for Unwanted Medical Alert Devices
April 23, 2015
At the FTC’s request, a U.S. District Court has prohibited Jason Abraham, a repeat offender, and his company, Brooklyn-based Instant Response Systems (‘IRS’) from calling elderly consumers and bullying and tricking them into paying for unordered medical alert devices. The Court also imposed a $3.4 million judgment against the defendants for their misconduct, which may be used to provide refund to defrauded consumers.
According to the FTC’s Complaint, filed in March 2013, telemarketers for IRS called elderly consumers, many of whom are in poor health and rely on others for help with their finances and pressured them into buying a medical alert service consisting of a pendant that supposedly would allow them to get help during emergencies. In many cases, IRS falsely claimed during sales calls that consumers had bought the service previously and owed the company hundreds of dollars.
The company shipped fake invoices and unordered medical alert pendants to consumers without their consent, repeatedly threatened them with legal action to coerce them into paying, and subjected them to repeated verbal abuse. The FTC also charged the defendants with illegally calling consumers whose phone numbers are on the National Do Not Call (‘DNC’) Registry.
Antitrust: European Commission (‘Commission’) opens formal investigation against Google in relation to Android mobile operating system
April 15, 2015
Commission initiated formal antitrust proceedings against Google with regard to its business practices related to Android. The Commission suspects that Google may have breached EU rules prohibiting anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position (Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). The initiation of proceedings is based on Article 11(6) of the Antitrust Regulation (Council Regulation No 1/2003) and Article 2(1) of its implementing Regulation (Commission Regulation No 773/2004).The Commission intends to investigate whether Google has illegitimately hindered the development and market access of rival mobile operating systems, applications or services for smartphones and tablets. The initiation of proceedings does not signify that the Commission has made a definitive finding of an infringement but merely signifies that the Commission will deal with the case as a matter of priority.
Republic of India (comprising pronouncements on anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position)
Shri Dominic Da’Silva v. M/s Vatika Group [Case No. 101 of 2014]
Mr. Mohit Manglani v. M/s Flipkart India Private Limited & Ors. [Case No. 80 of 2014]
The information was filed under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002 (the ‘Act’) by Mr. Mohit Manglani (‘Informant’) against M/s Flipkart India Private Limited (‘OP 1’), M/s Jasper Infotech Private Limited ( ‘OP 2’), M/s Xerion Retail Private Limited ( ‘OP 3’), M/s Amazon Seller Services Private Limited (‘OP 4’), M/s Vector E-commerce Private Limited ( ‘OP 5’) and other e-commerce/portal companies (collectively ‘OPs’) for their alleged contravention of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. The Informant alleged that the e-portals/e-commerce websites and product sellers enter into ‘exclusive agreements’ to sell the selected product exclusively on the selected portal to the exclusion of other e-portals or physical channels or through any other physical channel. Accordingly, the portal operator decides terms of resale, sale price, terms of payments, delivery period, quality and service standards etc. All of these conditions are non-negotiable for a consumer who intends to buy those products. Further, to create hype for the product, the supply is controlled by the e-portal with whom the exclusive arrangement has been made, creating an impression of scarcity. The Informant alleged that each e-portal i.e., each of the OPs has 100% market share for the product in which it is exclusively dealing and therefore, leads to dominance. It was contended that the relevant market in such a case has to be defined in context of a particular product in question and the dominance is also seen accordingly.
The Commission observed that bare perusal of the agreement on the touchstone of the factors laid out above suggests that the alleged agreements do not result in ‘appreciable adverse effect on competition’ (‘AAEC’). It does not seem that such arrangements create any entry barrier for new entrants. It seems very unlikely that an exclusive arrangement between a manufacturer and an e-portal will create any entry barrier as most of the products which are illustrated in the information to be sold through exclusive e-partners (‘Ops’) face competitive constraints. Further, it does not appear that because of these exclusive agreements any of the existing players in the retail market are getting adversely affected, rather with new e-portals entering into the market, competition seems to be growing. Further, the Commission observed that online distribution channel by the OPs provide an opportunity to the consumers to compare the prices as well as the pros and cons of the product. Therefore, it does not appear that the exclusive arrangement between manufacturers and OPs lead to AAEC in the market. With regard to Section 4 of the Act, the Commission observed that there are several players in the online retail market arrayed as OPs in the present case, offering similar facilities to their customers and therefore, no case of contravention of Section 3 and 4 was made out against the OPs.
M/s Saint Gobain Glass India Ltd. v. M/s Gujarat Gas Company Ltd. [Case No. 20 of 2013]
The information was filed by M/s Saint Gobain Glass India Ltd. (hereinafter, the ‘Informant’) under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002 (the ‘Act’) against M/s Gujarat Gas Company Limited (hereinafter, the ‘Opposite Party) alleging, inter alia, contravention of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. The Commission, upon examining all aspects of the case, vide its order dated May 31, 2013 under Section 26(1) of the Act, held that the conduct of Opposite Party was indicative of the existence of a prima facie contravention of the provisions of the Act and accordingly, directed the Director General ( ‘DG’) to investigate the matter. The Commission agreed with the DG findings in determining the relevant market that is the market for ‘the supply of non-APM natural gas to industrial customers located in Bharuch (excluding Vagra Taluka) and Surat (excluding Hazira) districts of Gujarat’. The DG arrived at the conclusion that the Opposite Party is a dominant enterprise in the relevant market because of its larger market share, significant size and resources, advantage of vertical integration, commercial advantages over other enterprise, etc. However, the Commission noted that the DG’s conclusion in this regard is largely based on market share of the Opposite Party and other factors such as size and resources, size and importance of competitors, vertical integration of the enterprises, dependence of consumers of the Opposite Party, etc. were not analysed in the proper perspective before coming to the conclusion that the Opposite Party is in a dominant position in the relevant market. According to the Commission, it was not thoroughly assessed whether the Opposite Party is operating independently of competitive forces in the relevant market or has the ability to affect the consumers or competitors or the relevant market in its favour. The Commission observed from DG report that in the relevant market players such as GSPC, IOCL, GAIL, etc. are operating and competing with the Opposite Party so far as the customers requiring more than 50000 SCMD gas are concerned. As the DG has calculated the market share of the Opposite Party in terms of total value and volume of sale taking into account the entire spectrum of customers of the Opposite Party and at the same time excluding the supply of APM gas by GAIL and IOCL in the relevant geographic market the conclusion drawn by the DG may not be depicting true picture of the market shares of the parties.
Further, the GAIL is supplying gas to the Opposite Party. The cumulative result of all these factors shows that on the one hand the market share of the Opposite Party has been calculated without applying any equaliser and on the other the presence of two heavy weights, i.e., IOCL and GAIL commanding consistently close second and third rank is definitely a factor which would constrain the behaviour of the Opposite Party. The Commission also noted that the Opposite Party has only one customer in its kitty which requires more than 1,00,000 SCMD gas and that is SGL/Informant. With the presence of such large companies including some of the ‘Navratna’ public sector undertakings of the government of India in the relevant market the Opposite Party, merely on the basis of questionable higher market share, cannot be considered to be in a dominant position in the relevant market. Further, in terms of scale of operation, size, resources and economic power competitors of the Opposite Party are far ahead of the Opposite Party. Also, the consumers are not entirely dependent on the Opposite Party for supply of natural gas in the relevant geographic market. Since GSPC, IOCL and GAIL are supplying natural gas in the in the relevant geographic market, the consumers are not dependent on the Opposite Party. The Commission, therefore, disagreed with the DG’s findings and held that in the relevant market the Opposite Party is not in a dominant position. Since Opposite Party is not found to be in a dominant position in the relevant market, there is no need to examine the alleged abusive conduct of the Opposite Party.
M/s Three D Integrated Solutions Ltd. v. M/s VeriFone India Sales Pvt. Ltd. [Case No. 13 of 2013]
The Informant, a company is engaged in the business of video broadcasting, audio broadcasting, etc filed the information against the Opposite Party, a wholly-owned subsidiary of M/s Verifone System Inc., headquartered in USA and has been engaged in the business of manufacturing, development and selling of hardware and software solutions alleging contravention of Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 (the ‘Act’). The Commission after considering the material available on record opined that prima facie the conduct of Opposite Party was in contravention of provisions of section 4 of the Act and the matter required investigation by the Director General. Accordingly, the DG was directed under section 26(1) of the Act to conduct an investigation into the matter.
Agreeing with the DG report, the Commission defined the relevant market to be market for POS terminals in India. The Commission concurred with the DG findings that the Opposite Party was in a dominant position in the relevant market of POS terminals in India during the relevant period. As to the abuse of dominant position by the Opposite Party, the Commission again found itself in agreement with the DG findings and held that the conduct of the Opposite Party is abusive in terms of section 4 of the Act. The Commission opined that through the SDK agreement, the Opposite Party imposed unfair conditions on the Informant which are in contravention of section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Act; restricted the provision of VAS services as well as limited/restricted the technical and scientific development of VAS services used in POS terminals in India which is in contravention of 4(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Act and also, the conduct of the Opposite Party with respect to seeking disclosure of sensitive business information from its customers in the downstream market in order to enable it to protect the downstream market of VAS services was found to be in contravention of the provisions of section 4(2)(e) of the Act. In view of the findings the Commission directed the Opposite Party to cease and desist from indulging in the activities which have been found to be anti-competitive in terms of the provisions of section 4 of the Act.
M/s Atos Worldline India Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Verifone India Sales Pvt. Ltd. Case No. 56 of 2012
M/s. Atos Worldline India Private Limited (‘Informant’) filed information under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002 (the ‘Act’) against the M/s. Verifone India Sales Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Verifone System Inc. (collectively ‘Opposite Parties’), inter alia, alleging contravention of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. The Commission after giving thoughtful consideration to the facts of the case found that prima facie, the conduct of the Opposite Party No. 1 was in violation of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act and accordingly, under Section 26(1) of the Act, the Commission directed the Director General (‘DG’) to conduct an investigation into the matter. The Commission carefully perused the information, the report of the DG and the replies/objections/ submissions/rejoinders filed by the Informant and the Opposite Parties and other material available on record. The Commission also heard the arguments put forth by the learned advocates appearing on the behalf of the Informant and the Opposite Party No. 1. The Commission felt that in order to arrive at a decision in the matter, the issue at hand requires delineation of relevant market, assessment of the position of dominance of the Opposite Party No. 1 in the relevant market and examination of its alleged abusive conduct in terms of section 4 of the Act in case the Opposite Party No. 1 is found to be in a dominant position in the relevant market.
The Commission concurred with the DG report that the market for Point of Sale (‘POS’) Terminals in India is considered as the relevant market in this case. The Commission in assessing the dominant position opined that there is no reason to deviate from the conclusion drawn by the DG in regards to position of dominance of the Opposite Party No. 1 in the relevant market and held that the Opposite Party No. 1 is in dominant position in the market of POS Terminals in India. Examining the alleged abusive conduct of the Opposite Party No. 1, the Commission held that that through the SDK agreement the Opposite Party No. 1 has imposed unfair conditions on VAS/TPP service providers which is in contravention of section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Act; restricted the provision of VAS services as well as limited/restricted the technical and scientific development of VAS services used in POS Terminals market in India which is in contravention of 4(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Act and also, the conduct of the Opposite Party No. 1 with respect to seeking disclosure of sensitive business information from its customers in the downstream market in order to enable to enter into the downstream market of VAS services is in contravention of the provisions of section 4(2)(e) of the Act. In view of the above findings, the Commission directed the Opposite Party No. 1 to cease and desist from indulging in the activities which have been found to be in contravention of the provisions of section 4 of the Act. Furthermore, in terms of the provisions contained in section 27(b) of the Act, the Commission imposed a penalty on the Opposite Party No. 1 at the rate of 5% of its turnover based on the financial statements filed by the Opposite Party No. 1.
United States of America
Federal Trade Commission (‘FTC’)
FTC Approves Final Order Barring AmeriFreight from Deceptively Touting Online Consumer Reviews and Failing to Disclose Incentives It Provided to Reviewers
April 20, 2015
The Federal Trade Commission has approved a final consent order with AmeriFreight, an automobile shipment broker, which stops the company from touting its highly rated online reviews while failing to disclose that the company compensated consumers to write them. According to the FTC’s February 2015 complaint, AmeriFreight represented that its online reviews were those of satisfied customers, but failed to disclose that AmeriFreight compensated the reviewers with discounts and incentives. AmeriFreight gave consumers $50 discounts to write favorable reviews, and offered consumers the chance to win an additional $100 if their review was selected for a monthly prize.
The final order settling the FTC’s complaint prohibits AmeriFreight from misrepresenting that their products or services are highly rated or top-ranked based on unbiased consumer reviews, or that customer reviews are unbiased. The order also requires the company to clearly and prominently disclose any material connection, if one exists, between the company and its endorsers.
FTC Approves Final Order Preserving Competition in Generic Drug Market for Treating Dry Mouth and Biliary Cirrhosis
April 27, 2015
The Federal Trade Commission has approved a final order settling charges that Impax Laboratories Inc.’s acquisition of CorePharma, LLC would likely be anticompetitive. Under the order, first announced in March 2015, the pharmaceutical companies have agreed to divest CorePharma’s rights and assets to generic pilocarpine tablets, which are used to treat dry mouth, and generic ursodiol tablets, which are used to treat biliary cirrhosis and gall bladder diseases. Perrigo Company plc, a global drug company headquartered in Ireland that markets generic drugs in the United States, is the Commission-approved buyer of the divested assets.
Republic of India
Combination Registration No. C-2014/05/170
The Commission received a notice under Section 6(2) of the Competition Act, 2002 (the ‘Act’) given by Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited (‘Sun Pharma’) and Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited (‘Ranbaxy’) (collectively ‘Parties’). The proposed combination relates to the merger of Ranbaxy into Sun Pharma pursuant to a Scheme of Arrangement under Sections 391-394 and other applicable provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and the Companies Act, 2013. In terms of paragraph 42 and 43 of the Order, the Parties were required to seek prior approval of the Commission regarding (a) the proposed purchaser; and (b) terms of final and binding sale and purchase agreement(s). Further, as per paragraph 58 of the Order, the Parties were required to submit a fully documented and reasoned proposal(s), including a copy of the final and binding sale and purchase agreement(s) to the Commission for its approval when the Parties reached an agreement with the approved purchaser. In accordance with the said requirement, the Parties submitted to the Commission a detailed proposal along with the agreed form of the Asset Purchase Agreement (‘APA’) and a Supply Agreement (‘SA’). In the Proposal, the Parties identified Emcure Pharmaceuticals Limited (‘Emcure’), a company incorporated in India, for divestment of all seven Divestment Products (as defined in the Order).
It is observed by the Commission that acquisition of Divestment Products by Emcure is not likely to cause any appreciable adverse effect on competition in the relevant market in India.
Combination Registration No. C-2015/01/236
The Commission received a notice under Section 6(2) of the Competition Act, 2002 (‘Act’) given by Carnival Films Private Limited (‘Carnival’ or ‘Acquirer’), pursuant to a Share Purchase Agreement dated 15th December, 2014 (‘SPA’), entered, inter alios, between Carnival, Reliance Media Works Limited (‘Reliance Media’) and Cinema Ventures Private Limited, a subsidiary of Reliance Media (‘CVPL’). As per the information provided in the notice, pursuant to a Business Transfer Agreement executed on 14th December, 2014 between Reliance Media and CVPL (‘BTA’), the film exhibition business of Reliance Media along with the food and beverages business which is a part of such film exhibition business but excluding all forms of film exhibition through internet, mobile or television of Reliance Media, would be transferred to CVPL. It has been stated in the notice that 88 cinemas, 72 multiplexes and 16 single screen cinemas operated by Reliance Media having 238 screens are proposed to be transferred by Reliance Media to CVPL (‘Transferred Business’) and pursuant to the SPA, Carnival will acquire 98 percent of the share capital of CVPL whereas a director of Carnival will acquire the remaining 2 percent of its share capital. The Commission noted that pursuant to the proposed combination, there are overlaps between Carnival, Stargaze and Reliance Media with respect to the multiplexes in seven cities namely Indore, Mumbai, Dindigul, Ghaziabad, Dehradun, Raipur and Ajmer. The Commission noted that in the relevant markets of Indore, Mumbai, Ghaziabad, Dehradun, Raipur and Ajmer, competition concerns may not arise as there are other multiplexes in addition to cinemas operated by Carnival, Stargaze and Reliance Media in these cities exercising competitive constraint on the Acquirer pursuant to the proposed combination in terms of the pricing and services offered within the cinemas. The Commission also noted in this regard that since the proposed combination is not likely to raise any competition concerns in these cities, the precise delineation of the relevant market on the basis of factors listed above may be left open.
Considering the facts on record and the details provided in the notice given under Section 6(2) of the Act and assessment of the proposed combination on the basis of factors stated in Section 20(4) of the Act, the Commission is of the opinion that the proposed combination is not likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India and therefore, the same is approved under Section 31(1) of the Act.
United Kingdom (UK)
Competition and Market Authority (‘CMA’)
Crawford & Company Adjusters (UK) / GAB Robins Holdings UK merger inquiry [ME/6503-14]
March 17, 2015
The CMA in this matter considered whether the transaction in question would result in the creation of a relevant merger situation under the merger provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002 and, if so, whether such creation would result in a substantial lessening of competition within any market or markets in the United Kingdom for goods or services. Crawford & Company Adjusters (UK) Limited (Crawford) acquired GAB Robins Holdings UK LTD (‘GAB’) and a merger was formed. The Competition and Markets Authority (‘CMA’) considered that the Parties have ceased to be distinct and that the share of supply test is met and therefore, a relevant merger situation has been created. The Parties overlap in the supply of claims management and loss-adjusting services in the UK. The CMA considered that it is likely that separate frames of reference exist for claims management and loss-adjusting services that are provided for property, casualty, motor and aviation claims. The CMA has found that the Parties’ have relatively low shares of supply, there is limited evidence of close competition between the Parties pre-Merger, numerous other competitors will remain in the market, and customers did not raise any material concerns. As a result of these constraints, the CMA refused to believe that the Merger would result in a substantial lessening of competition within any market or markets in the UK for goods or services and therefore, need not be referred under Section 22(1) of the Enterprise Act.
European Union (‘EU’)
ZIMMER / BIOMET Merger [Case No. M-7265]n March 30, 2015
The European Commission has approved under the EU Merger Regulation the proposed acquisition of Biomet Inc by Zimmer Holdings Inc., both of the United States. Both companies produce orthopaedic implants and related surgical products. The approval is conditional upon a commitments package submitted by Zimmer. The Commission had concerns that the merger, as initially notified, could have resulted in price increases for a number of orthopaedic implants in the European Economic Area (EEA). The commitments offered by Zimmer remove these concerns.
ZF/TRW Merger [Case No. M. 7420]
March 12, 2015
The European Commission has approved the acquisition of the global automotive component manufacturer TRW of the US by its rival ZF Friedrichshafen of Germany under the EU Merger Regulation. The decision is conditional upon the divestment of TRW’s businesses in the design, manufacturing and sale of chassis components. The Commission had concerns that the deal as notified could have led to price increases for chassis components because the few remaining players in this market would have been unable to sufficiently constrain the merged entity. Both ZF and TRW currently supply chassis components to car and truck manufacturers in the European Economic Area (EEA) as well as to the independent national aftermarkets for their repair and maintenance. The proposed transaction, as originally notified, would have combined the two largest suppliers of chassis components for car and truck manufacturers’ in the EEA. ZF and TRW are currently important and close competitors on this market. The Commission’s investigation showed that it is difficult for new players to enter the market, in particular due to the high technical requirements and investments needed to do so. Moreover, most customers are not able to produce such components in-house and appear to have insufficient buyer power to counteract any potential price increases by the merged entity. The Commission therefore had concerns that the proposed transaction would have led to price increases for car and truck chassis components.
China Shipbuilding Power Engineering Institute / Wärtsilä Technology / Cssc Wärtsilä Engine Merger [Case No. M. 7501]
March 25, 2015
The European Commission has approved under the EU Merger Regulation the creation of a joint venture between Wärtsilä Corporation of Finland and China Shipbuilding Power Engineering Institute (CSPI), a subsidiary of the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) ultimately controlled by the Chinese State. The joint venture would be based in Shanghai and operate under the name CSSC Wärtsilä Engine. It will produce 4-stroke medium speed diesel engines based on Wärtsilä’s technology in China. CSSC is the parent company of one of the largest shipbuilding conglomerates in China that, among other activities, manufactures marine-related equipment. Wärtsilä is a provider of power solutions for the marine and energy markets. The Commission concluded that the proposed transaction would not raise competition concerns, because the joint venture has no actual or foreseen activities within the European Economic area (EEA).
Mvv/Baywa Re/Glendimplex/Greencom/Beegy Merger [Case No. M. 7522]
April 21, 2015
The European Commission has approved under the EU Merger Regulation the creation of a joint venture between MVV Energie AG, BayWa r.e. renewable energies GmbH, GreenCom Networks AG (all of Germany) and GlenDimplex Ltd. (Ireland). The joint venture will be based in Germany and operate under the name of BEEGY GmbH. It will provide decentralised energy management services, primarily in Germany. Both MVV Energie AG and BayWa r.e. are active in the energy sector, GlenDimplex Ltd. is an Irish heating and cooling system manufacturer and GreenCom Networks is a software specialist. The Commission concluded that the proposed transaction would raise no competition concerns, because the parent companies do not pursue the same activities as the joint venture and supply relationship are limited. The transaction therefore will have a limited impact on the market structure.
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Doc ID: CL/05/15